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JURISDICTION AND CERTIFICATION OF PURPOSE 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as 
amended. The Court's decision was entered November 13, 1992. This petition for rehearing 
is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and is presented in good faith 
and not for purposes of delay. 
POINTS OF LAW AND FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, 
Plaintiff and appellant Nielsen hereby petitions for rehearing of the appeal in this action 
only with respect to the Court's denial of appellant's claim for pre-judgment interest. Petitioner 
submits that the Court overlooked or misapprehended certain points as follows: 
The Court's decision was based upon the misapprehension that Nielsen did not pursue 
a claim for breach of contract against respondent Metropolitan in the court below, and failed to 
address Nielsen's argument that pre-judgment interest is available even in a non-contract action 
if the insurer knew or should have known that its insured was entitled to full policy limits. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED UPON THE MISAPPREHENSION 
THAT NIELSEN DID NOT ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST METROPOLITAN, AND FAILED 
TO ADDRESS NIELSEN'S ARGUMENT THAT INTEREST WAS 
AVAILABLE EVEN IF NO CONTRACT CLAIM WAS INVOLVED. 
In the appeal of this matter, appellant Nielsen argued that respondent Metropolitan is 
liable for pre-judgment interest on the amount of its policy limits, which this Court found to be 
$250,000, until the date upon which the limits were paid to Nielsen after the trial. (Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 19-25; Brief of Respondent, pp. 28-35; Reply Brief of Appellantf pp. 18-24). 
In its Opinion, the Court recognized Nielsen's argument that "he has a contractual 
relationship with Metropolitan and, therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1) 
(redesignated as § 15-1-1(2)) and Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. [701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985)], he is entitled to prejudgment interest on the $250,000 regardless of the policy limits." 
(Opinion at 10). The Court further recognized that "Beck established that a first-party insured's 
claim against an insurer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives 
rise to a cause of action in contract whereby consequential damages may be awarded in excess 
of policy limits. Section 15-1-1(1) establishes the legal rate of prejudgment interest in a breach 
of contract as 10 percent per annum." (Id.) 
In rejecting Nielsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, however, the Court made the 
following assertion: 
The difficulty with this argument is that Nielsen did not pursue a breach of 
contract claim against Metropolitan. The proceedings were limited to establishing 
2 
coverage under the policy, and no determination was made as to whether the 
policy was breached. Nielsen never asserted that Metropolitan breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Nor did he assert that 
Metropolitan breached an express covenant by failing to "pay all sums which the 
insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages" pursuant to the 
policy's terms. (Bold in original.) Indeed, Metropolitan promptly paid the 
$250,000 after the judgment. Because Nielsen failed to pursue a claim for breach 
of contract, we do not address the issue of whether an insurer who breaches a 
contract with its first-party insured is liable for prejudgment interest in excess of 
the policy limits. 
In declining to reach the issue of Nielsen's entitlement to pre-judgment interest, the Court 
erroneously assumed that Nielsen's action against Metropolitan did not encompass a breach of 
contract theory in addition to the coverage issue to which the Court referred. Nielsen's amended 
complaint, included in the record on appeal under U.R.A.P. ll(d)(B)(i) and attached in the 
Addendum, sets forth as its Fourth Cause of Action the following allegations: 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 11 through 16 above. 
18. Defendant insurance company [Metropolitan] has provided 
uninsured motorist insurance to plaintiff Richard Nielsen, wherein defendant 
insurance company agreed to indemnify plaintiff for damages sustained in any 
accident caused by the negligence of the operator of any uninsured vehicle up to 
the policy limit of $250,000.00. 
19. The collision described above was caused entirely by the negligence 
of defendants O'Reilly and French, who were uninsured at the time of the 
accident. 
20. After the accident plaintiff made timely demand on defendant 
insurance company for payment of plaintiff s damages as provided by the terms 
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of the insurance policy. Defendant insurance company has refused and still 
refuses payment of all damages sustained as a result from the accident. 
21. Defendant insurance company is therefore liable to plaintiff for all 
damages plaintiff is entitled to recover against defendants O'Reilly and French. 
(R.28). The request for relief against Metropolitan sought, among other things, pre-judgment 
interest. (R.29). 
The amended complaint sets forth the elements of a breach of contract claim: The 
existence of a contract (the insurance policy); breach (refusal of payment of Nielsen's damages 
as provided by the terms of the insurance policy); and harm (refusal of payment). While the 
cause of action had no specific label such as "breach of contract," well-established principles of 
notice pleading require only that a plaintiff set forth allegations of conduct sufficient to put the 
defendant on notice of the plaintiffs claim. "[T]he fundamental purpose of our liberalized 
pleading rules is to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement that their adversary have 
'fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation 
involved.'" Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). As courts 
have unanimously concluded under the similar federal rule, it is not necessary under the notice 
pleading provisions of Rule 8 to identify specific legal theories, if factual allegations are 
sufficient to support any claim for relief. See, 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1219 ("Rule 8(a) eliminates the concept of 'cause of action'"), and cases cited 
therein. 
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The allegations of Nielsen's amended complaint include assertions that payment of policy 
limits was due under the terms of the policy, demanded, and refused. If Nielsen's claim had 
been solely relating to coverage, as the Court assumed, the complaint would need only to have 
alleged a UM insurance relationship and an accident involving an uninsured motorist. The 
additional allegations of Metropolitan's refusal to make payment as obligated under the policy 
are sufficient to state a claim against Metropolitan under a breach of contract theory. 
Throughout the proceedings below, Metropolitan never challenged the fact that Nielsen 
was asserting a breach of contract claim. Instead, Metropolitan contended that it was 
inappropriate to characterize the claim as sounding in contract for purposes of pre-judgment 
interest, arguing that the amount due under the contract could not be ascertained with 
mathematical certainty.1 Thus, even if the amended complaint had not set forth the elements 
of a breach of contract claim with sufficient specificity, Metropolitan's and the district court's 
recognition that Nielsen was in fact asserting such a claim effectively amended the complaint to 
1
 Metropolitan made a similar argument on appeal: 
In essence, Nielsen is trying to make a contract action out of a case that is clearly 
a tort action. While it is true that an action by an insured against his carrier is 
an action based on contract, this is not such an action. No suit has been filed 
against Metropolitan with regard to coverage nor have any claims been made. 
Rather, Nielsen is attempting to claim what Utah law clearly does not allow, by 
couching this action as a contract action rather than recognizing that the claim he 
is making is for prejudgment interest on the damages he sustained in the 
underlying tort action (the automobile accident). (Brief of Respondent, p. 28). 
Metropolitan then devoted the remainder of its discussion to claiming that Nielsen's 
damages were not calculable with mathematical accuracy, which ordinarily precludes pre-
judgment interest on general damages in a personal injury case. (Id., pp. 28-31). 
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encompass the contract claim. U.R.Civ.P. 15(b) ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings."). 
In rejecting appellant's claims, the Court thus made a factual assumption — that Nielsen's 
action only related to coverage - which was directly contradicted by the pleadings and the 
parties' conduct below. The Court's reliance upon the erroneous assumption that Nielsen did 
not pursue a breach of contract claim against Metropolitan warrants rehearing, so that the Court 
may reach the issue of pre-judgment interest which it declined to decide based upon that 
assumption. 
Additionally, the Court's opinion fails to address Nielsen's argument that, even if the 
action against Metropolitan were not grounded in contract, pre-judgment interest would be 
awardable if Metropolitan knew, or should have known, that it would have to pay policy limits 
to Nielsen. (See Brief of Appellant, p. 20, and cases cited therein.) Thus, if Nielsen had not 
in fact alleged a breach of contract claim, the line of cases cited in Nielsen's brief would 
nonetheless provide entitlement to pre-judgment interest if a jury determined that Metropolitan 
knew, or should have known, that Nielsen was entitled to immediate or earlier payment of the 
$250,000 policy limits. 
Finally, in connection with his argument for pre-judgment interest, Nielsen noted that 
public policy would not favor allowing a first-party insurer to refuse payment in a clear policy 
limits case for seven years, allowing the insurer the use of that money for those years, and 
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ultimately face no greater penalty than having to pay those limits. In declining to invoke the 
public policy considerations favoring an award of interest, the Court noted that "absent 
legislative direction to the contrary, contracts are to be enforced as written." (Opinion at 11). 
On this issue, it should be noted that the legislature has indicated that delay in payment of 
insurance benefits should result in the imposition of interest in addition to the benefit amount. 
In 1985, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, which provides: "Unless 
otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every valid insurance claim made by an 
insured. By rule the commissioner may prescribe . . . the reasonable interest rates to be charged 
upon late claim payments." The plain implication of this provision is that interest is 
appropriately awarded on untimely benefit payments, even though such interest might exceed the 
benefits cap under a particular policy. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-8 [now 31A-22-309(5)] 
(untimely personal injury protection benefit payments subject to interest at 1 1/2% per month; 
person entitled to such benefits may bring action in contract to recover the payments plus the 
applicable interest). 
It is apparent that the Utah legislature recognizes the appropriateness of requring an 
insurer to pay interest on benefits not paid timely, even though such interest may necessarily 
exceed the cap on the benefit amount. This Court should therefore make a determination of the 
availability of such interest in the instant case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellant respectfully requests the Court to grant 
rehearing on the issue of pre-judgment interest. 
DATED this of November, 1992. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
JM/W-1 
'.. Rich Humpherys 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Opinion of Utah Supreme Court 
2. Amended Complaint 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00-
Richard H. Nielsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark O'Reilly, Linda R. French, 
and Metropolitan Property & 
Liability Insurance Co., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: L. Rich Humpherys, Karra 
for Richard Nielsen 
Glenn C. Hanni, Barbara L. Maw, Salt Lake City, for 
Metropolitan Property 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Richard H. Nielsen appeals the judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court that $250,000 is the maximum 
recovery possible under the uninsured motorist provision of an 
insurance policy issued by defendant Metropolitan Property & 
Liability Insurance Co. ("Metropolitan") . We affirm. 
The facts of this case are undisputed. Prior to April 
of 1983, Nielsen purchased an insurance policy from Metropolitan. 
The policy insured two automobiles owned by Nielsen and was in 
force at all relevant times. Among other coverages, the policy 
included uninsured motorist protection with a limit of $250,000 
for "each person" and $500,000 for "each accident." Metropolitan 
charged a separate premium for each vehicle. 
On April 28, 1983, Nielsen and his son were involved in 
an automobile accident with two uninsured motorists, Mark 
O'Reilly and Linda French. As a result of the accident, both 
Nielsen and his son sustained personal injuries and filed claims 
with Metropolitan. Metropolitan settled the claim of Nielsen's 
son and made a partial payment of $1,707 to Nielsen. However, no 
settlement was reached on the remaining portion of Nielsen's 
claim. Ultimately, Nielsen filed suit against Metropolitan, 
No. 900489 
F I L E D 
November 13, 1992 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
J. Porter, Salt Lake City, 
O'Reilly, and French, seeking an apportionment of fault and a 
determination of Nielsens damages and Metropolitan's liability. 
The suit proceeded to a jury trial. O'Reilly and 
French defaulted. However, Metropolitan undertook their defense, 
disputing Nielsen's damage claims and asserting that Nielsen's 
own negligence was the primary cause of the accident. At trial, 
the parties stipulated that the question of Metropolitan's 
liability would not be presented to the jury. Rather, the court 
would determine Metropolitan's liability based on the jury's 
special verdict. 
The jury determined that Nielsen was 3 percent at fault 
and O'Reilly and French were 97 percent at fault and awarded 
Nielsen $213,593 in special damages and $500,000 in general 
damages. After a reduction for comparative fault and an addition 
of interest and court costs, the court entered judgment against 
O'Reilly and French in the amount of $707,590. 
Following trial, Nielsen moved for summary judgment, 
seeking to recover the entire $707,590 judgment from Metropolitan 
in addition to prejudgment interest. Metropolitan argued that 
the limit on its coverage is $250,000 and that an insurer is not 
liable for prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limits. 
The trial court ruled in favor of Metropolitan. 
This case presents three issues on appeal: (1) whether 
the $250,000-per-person limit, as opposed to the $500,000-per-
accident limit, governs Nielsen's claim; (2) whether Nielsen is 
entitled to stack the policy limits because he paid separate 
premiums on two automobiles; and (3) whether Nielsen can recover 
prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limits. Because the 
trial court disposed of each of these issues on summary judgment, 
which by definition decides only questions of law, we grant the 
trial court decision no deference and review for correctness.1 
In claiming that he is entitled to the $500,000 limit 
and that he may stack the policy limits, Nielsen asserts that the 
trial court erred in interpreting the policy's language. 
Generally, the interpretation of insurance policy language 
presents a question of law to be decided by the trial judge using 
1
 Summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); Transamerica 
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 
(Utah 1990). 
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accepted methods of construction,2 Specifically, the terms of 
insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be 
interpreted in accordance with their usually accepted meanings 
and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to harmonize and 
give effect to all of the contract provisions.3 To protect 
against overreaching insurers and because courts construe 
contracts against their drafters, ambiguities in the policy are 
resolved in favor of coverage.4 Policy language is ambiguous if 
it is not "'plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and 
understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in 
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and 
in the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of 
the policy.#,,s 
Nielsen first contends that the language of the policy 
can be read as providing coverage of $500,000 in cases where two 
or more people suffer injuries in one accident and that any 
language purporting to limit liability to $250,000 per person is 
ambiguous. Therefore, this language does not deny coverage. The 
provision in question states: 
Protection Against Uninsured Motorists 
Coverage. 
The limit for Protection Against 
Uninsured Motorists Coverage stated in the 
Declarations as applicable to "each person11 
[$250,000] is the limit of METROPOLITAN'S 
liability for all damages arising out of 
bodily injury sustained by one person in any 
one accident, and subject to this provision, 
the limit of liability stated in the 
Declarations as applicable to "each accident" 
[$500,000] is the total limit of 
METROPOLITAN'S liability for all such damages 
2
 LPS Hosp. v, Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 
(Utah 1988). 
3
 LPS Hosp., 765 P.2d at 858; Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 
895. 
4
 See Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co.r 
190 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11-12 (June 22, 1992); LPS HOSP., 765 P.2d 
at 858; Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 669 P.2d 410, 417 
(Utah 1983); Phillips v. Utah Local Gov'ts Trust, 660 P.2d 249, 
250 (Utah 1983). 
5
 LPS Hosp., 765 P.2d at 858-59 (quoting Auto Lease Co. v. 
Central Mut. Ins., 325 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1958) (footnote 
omitted)). 
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for bodily injury sustained by two or more 
persons in any one accident. 
(Bold in original.) Nielsen maintains that this language is 
ambiguous because the policy does not define the terms "subject 
to this provision" and "person." This fact, however, does not 
render the policy unclear to a person of ordinary intelligence 
and understanding. The policy clearly limits the amount one 
person can recover in one accident to $250,000, and therefore, 
the provision should be given effect.6 
Similarly, Nielsen asserts that he is entitled to stack 
the applicable policy limit. He points out that uninsured 
motorist coverage, unlike liability coverage, is not linked to a 
particular vehicle but is a floating coverage that covers the 
insured for injuries and damages caused by uninsured motorists in 
all circumstances. Therefore, he argues, it is reasonable to 
expect additional coverage upon the payment of an additional 
premium. Nielsen claims that this fact creates an ambiguity as 
to whether he should be able to stack two policy limits of 
$250,000 to arrive at a total limit of $500,000, because he paid 
separate premiums on two automobiles. 
The policy, however, contains the following provision: 
5. OTHER AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND 
METROPOLITAN. 
With respect to any occurrence, accident 
or loss to which this and any other 
automobile insurance policy issued to the 
named insured by METROPOLITAN also applies, 
the total limit of METROPOLITAN'S liability 
under all such policies shall not exceed the 
highest applicable limit of liability or 
benefit amount under any one such policy. 
(Bold in original.) 
Nielsen claims that this provision is ambiguous because 
it appears in the general conditions section as opposed to the 
uninsured motorist section and because it refers to other 
insurance instead of other coverages. These facts, however, are 
of no significance. The provision clearly prohibits the stacking 
of policy limits. Indeed, we have held almost identical language 
6
 Other jurisdictions have found similar provisions to be 
unambiguous. See Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, Michigan 
v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97, 103 (9th Cir. 1952); Allstate Ins. v. 
Ostenson, 713 P.2d 733, 735 (Wash. 1986). 
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to be unambiguous,7 Furthermore, the placement of a provision 
does not affect its validity. As noted above, insurance policies 
must be interpreted as a whole, giving effect to all provisions. 
Reading the policy as a whole, the above-quoted language resolves 
any ambiguity as to whether an insured can stack policy limits. 
Nielsen also argues that even if we determine the 
above-quoted provision to be unambiguous, the provision should 
not be given effect. Rather, as a matter of public policy, we 
should enforce Nielsens reasonable expectation that he can stack 
the policy limits. 
In making this argument, Nielsen asks this court to 
adopt a version of the reasonable expectations doctrine, a 
doctrine developed to protect against overreaching insurers that, 
under certain circumstances, allows courts faced with an adhesion 
contract to look to the insured's reasonable expectations in 
determining policy coverage.8 Other jurisdictions have adopted 
various formulations of this doctrine, such as allowing the 
enforcement of expectations in direct conflict with clear policy 
language.9 
This court, however, has never adopted any version of 
the doctrine. Indeed, in a case just recently decided, Allen v. 
Prudential,10 we declined to adopt two formulations of the 
doctrine presented in thai: case. Specifically, we rejected an 
assertion that in dealing with an adhesion contract, the 
reasonable expectations of the insured should be enforced as a 
7
 In Martin v. Christensen, 454 P.2d 294, 295 (Utah 1969), 
we found the following provision to be unambiguous: 
With respect to any occurrence, accident or 
loss to which this and any other insurance 
policy or policies issued to the insured by 
the Company also apply, no payment shall be 
made hereunder which, when added to any 
amount paid or payable under such other 
insurance policy or policies, would result in 
a total payment to the insured or any other 
person in excess of the highest applicable 
limit of liability under any one such policy. 
8
 See AljLen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9; see also Roger C. 
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance 
Law After Two Decades, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 823 (1990) [hereinafter 
Henderson]. 
9
 See Allen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9; see also Henderson; 
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered. 18 Conn. 
L. Rev. 323, 335-36, 345 (1986). 
10
 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (June 22, 1992). 
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matter of course.11 We noted that such a claim was without 
support and "overreaches the rationale for the [reasonable 
expectations] doctrine, even at its broadest [point]."12 
We also rejected a more mainstream approach suggested 
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Wagner v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange.13 Under the Wagner formulation, the insured's 
reasonable expectations may be enforced if "the insurer knew or 
should have known of the insured's expectations; . . . the 
insured created or helped to create these expectations, and . . , 
the insured's expectations are reasonable."14 If the fact 
finder is convinced that these three requirements are met, the 
reasonable expectations of the insured will be enforced in the 
face of contrary and unambiguous policy language.15 
In rejecting Wagner's approach, we noted that 
regardless of the formulation of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine, substantial uncertainty surrounds "the theoretical 
underpinnings of the doctrine, its scope, and the details of its 
application."16 We also noted our belief that case-by-case 
development of Utah's traditional equitable remedies suffices to 
protect against overreaching insurers.17 
However, the holding in Allen is predicated primarily 
on the predominant role the legislative and executive branches 
have undertaken in regulating the insurance industry and 
establishing the public policy underlying Utah's insurance 
law.18 We rejected the Wagner formulation oecause, in the 
absence of legislative direction, invalidating a clear provision 
on the basis that the insurer knew about and helped to create a 
reasonable expectation in conflict with the provision would 
undercut expressed legislative policy underlying the regulation 
11 
12 
Id. at 10. 
Id. 
13
 786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
14
 id. at 766; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law 
and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations 
of the Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1151, 1179-80 (1981). 
15
 See Wagner, 786 P.2d at 766-67. 
16
 Alien, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. 
17
 Id^ at 12. 
18
 See id. at 10 (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-2-101 to 
-29-123 (1991)). 
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of the insurance industry.19 Specifically, such an approach 
conflicts with the legislatively expressed policy that f"freedom 
of contract' be maintained and that written contracts be the 
primary means by which this freedom of contract [is] 
exercised."20 In so holding, we did not abandon our 
responsibility to develop common law principles relating to the 
insurance industry within parameters not preempted by the 
legislature. Rather, we merely reaffirmed our traditional 
position of deferring to legislatively announced policy.21 
The instant case differs from Allen in two important 
respects: (1) the formulation of the doctrine before the court; 
and (2) the fact that Allen dealt with title 31A, the insurance 
code in effect after July 1, 1986, while the present case deals 
with title 31, the insurance code in effect prior to July 1, 
1986.22 We turn first to the question of the formulation of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine. Nielsen does not advance a 
recognized version of the reasonable expectations doctrine. 
Instead, he bases his argument on two factors peculiar to the 
instant case. 
First, he argues that his expectation of the ability to 
stack policy limits is reasonable, given the floating nature of 
uninsured motorist protection, i.e., protection that is not 
linked to a particular automobile, and the fact that he paid 
separate premiums on two automobiles. Second, he points to the 
fact that in calculating the premium for the secqmd vehicle. 
Metropolitan does not take into account that: part of the premium 
charged on the first insured vehicle is a cnarge for uninsured 
motorist protection. The result is that the more vehicles 
insured, the more Metropolitan charges for uninsured motorist 
protection.23 
19
 See id. at 11. 
20
 Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-1-102(7), 31A-21-301 to 
-404 (1991 & Supp. 1991)). 
21
 See id. at 10-11; see alsor e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto, 
Ins. v. Mastbaum. 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987); General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983). 
22
 See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 242. 
23
 It appears from the record that when he purchased the 
insurance, Nielsen did not have a subjective expectation that he 
was entitled to stack his policy limits. Instructions to the 
jury stated that the maximum amount recoverable from Metropolitan 
was $250,000. It appears from the attorney's argument that 
Nielsen did not make his claim of entitlement to stack his policy 
limits until after the jury verdict was returned. 
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In essence, under Nielsen's formulation, if the insured 
can link a reasonable expectation of greater coverage to the 
payment of an additional amount in premiums, the insured's 
reasonable expectations will be enforced in the face of clear 
policy language to the contrary• Given our holding in Allen, the 
first question in determining if we should adopt this version of 
the doctrine is whether it undercuts legislatively announced 
public policy. 
We again note that the insurance code applicable in the 
instant case differs from the insurance *code applicable in Allen. 
Any analysis of the distinctions between title 31 and title 31A 
must begin with the recognition that, as we observed in AllenP 
"[m]any of the provisions in title 31A mirror the provisions in 
title 31, and both titles are equally comprehensive in their 
scope and regulatory effect."24 
Indeed, both titles establish an "Insurance Department" 
and delegate to the commissioner the power to promulgate rules 
implementing the provisions of the insurance code and the power 
to investigate violations of the insurance code.25 Under both 
titles, preprinted policies must be filed with the commissioner, 
who has the authority to invalidate any form determined to be 
deceptive or unfair.26 Thus, as in Allen, "the validity of 
preprinted insurance contracts is premised on executive 
approval."27 Finally, inherent in both titles is the 
legislatively announced policy that freedom to contract be 
maintained and written contracts be the primary means by which 
this freedom is exercised.28 Clearly, the same policy relied 
on in Allen applies in the instant case, and therefore, the Allen 
reasoning applies here with equal force. 
24
 Allen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 n.8. 
25
 Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-2-1 to -16 (1953 & Supp. 
1983) (repealed 1986) with Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-2-101 to -311 
(1991). 
26
 Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-19-9(1) to -10 (1953) 
(repealed 1986) with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-201(2)(a)(i) (1991). 
27
 Allen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. 
28
 Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-19-1 to -29 (1953 & Supp. 
1983) (repealed 1986) (setting forth detailed provisions for the 
right to contract, authorizing insurance clauses, and 
establishing that any modifications must be in writing) with Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(7) and §§ 31A-21-303 to -404 (1991 & Supp. 
1991) (establishing policy of maintaining freedom to contract, 
setting forth detailed provisions authorizing and governing 
insurance contract clauses, and setting forth acceptable methods 
of modification). 
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We have decided several cases under title 31 wherein an 
insured sought to stack uninsured motorist limits, and in each 
case, we refused to allowed stacking.29 One case, Martin v. 
Christensen,30 is similar to the case at bar. In Martin, the 
plaintiff argued that because two separate premiums were paid to 
one insurance company, the plaintiff should be allowed to stack 
policy limits despite clear policy language to the contrary.31 
This contention was based in part on the argument that the 
legislature, in enacting uninsured motorist legislation, intended 
to allow stacking in such circumstances.32 However, we 
concluded that the legislature had no such intention and enforced 
the contract as written.33 Utah therefore has no public policy 
in favor of stacking policy limits when an insured pays multiple 
premiums to the same insurer. 
Given Allen and Martin, we decline to adopt Nielsen's 
position. Ignoring the clear language of the policy because 
Nielsen claims that he expected additional coverage due to the 
payment of an additional premium would significantly modify 
legislatively expressed public policy underlying the regulation 
of the insurance industry. Charging more for uninsured motorist 
protection to those who insure more than one vehicle may not be 
the most rational method cf calculating premiums. However, it 
does not justify a judicial rewriting of the insurance contract 
in violation of legislative policy and prior case law. Hence, 
the trial court did not err in ruling that the policy limit on 
Nielsen's claim is $250,000. 
Finally, Nielsen contends that the trial court erred in 
declining to award prejudgment interest in excess of the policy 
limits. First, Nielsen claims that he has a contractual 
relationship with Metropolitan and, therefore, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1) (redesignated as § 15-1-1(2)) and Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange,34 he is entitled to prejudgment 
interest on the $250,000 regardless of the policy limits. Beck 
established that a first-party insured's claim against an insurer 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
gives rise to a cause of action in contract whereby consequential 
See Lvon v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co,, 480 P.2d 
739, 745 (Utah 1971); Martin v. Christensen. 454 P.2d 294, 296 
(Utah 1969); Russell v. Paulson, 417 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1966). 
30
 454 P.2d 294 (Utah 1969). 
31
 Id. at 295. 
Id. at 295-96. 
Id. at 296. 
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
9 No. 900489 
damages may be awarded in excess of policy limits.35 Section 15-
1-1(1) establishes the legal rate of prejudgment interest in a 
breach of contract as 10 percent per annum. 
The difficulty with this argument is that Nielsen did 
not pursue a breach of contract claim against Metropolitan. The 
proceedings were limited to establishing coverage under the 
policy, and no determination was made as to whether the policy 
was breached. Nielsen never asserted that Metropolitan breached 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Nor did he 
assert that Metropolitan breached an express covenant by failing 
to "pay all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally 
entitled to recover as damages" pursuant to the policy's terms. 
(Bold in original.) Indeed, Metropolitan promptly paid the 
$250,000 after the judgment. Because Nielsen failed to pursue a 
claim for breach of contract, we do not address the issue of 
whether an insurer who breaches a contract with its first-party 
insured is liable for prejudgment interest in excess of the 
policy limits. 
In an alternative argument, Nielsen claims that the 
insurance policy and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 provide for the 
award of prejudgment interest on his special damages in excess of 
the policy limits.36 Metropolitan admits that the policy 
provides for the award of prejudgment interest on Nielsen's 
special damages. A majority of courts have interpreted the 
language "all sums which the insured . . • shall be legally 
entitled to recover as damages" to include prejudgment interest 
properly awarded in the underlying personal injury action.37 
These courts reason that prejudgment interest is part of the 
damages the insured is legally entitled to recover.38 However, 
the policy limits clearly apply to the term "damages." 
Therefore, Nielsen may not be awarded prejudgment interest in 
excess of these limits.39 
35
 Id. at 800-02. 
36
 Section 78-27-44 establishes that prejudgment interest 
may be awarded on special damages in personal injury cases. 
37
 See, e.g., Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979); 
Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cooper. 262 A.2d 370 
(R.I. 1970); see also 15S Couch on Insurance 2d, § 56:10 (1983) 
[hereinafter Couch]. 
38
 See, e.g., Guin v. Ha; Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Cooper; see also Couch at § 56:10. 
39
 See Guin v. Ha; Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Cooper; see also Couch at § 56:10. 
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As for Nielsen's claim that as a matter of public 
policy he should be awarded prejudgment interest in excess of the 
policy limits regardless of the policy language, we reiterate the 
public policy requirement that absent legislative direction to 
the contrary, contract provisions are to be enforced as written. 
Hence, we affirm the trial court's ruling that Nielsen is not 
entitled to recover prejudgment interest in excess of the policy 
limits. 
Affirmed, 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Russell W. Bench, Court of 
Appeals Judge 
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting) 
The majority opinion holds that an insurance company 
may sell two Uninsured motorist coverages to an insured, charge 
two premiums for those coverages, and then never have to pay out 
under one of them. The majority condones what I submit is 
unconscionable conduct tantamount to fraud on the plaintiff and 
the public. 
The plaintiff purchased an automobile insurance policy 
that provided separate coverages on each of the insured's two 
automobiles. The policy provided two uninsured motorist 
coverages for which the insured paid two separate premiums. Each 
coverage had a policy limit of $250,000. The plaintiff was 
injured by an uninsured motorist and suffered damages in the 
amount of $707,595. The plaintiff contends that he is entitled 
to recover $250,000 under each coverage, or a total of $500,000, 
because he bought and paid for two coverages. This Court holds 
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover under only one 
uninsured motorist coverage because the "other insurance clause" 
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in the policy relieves the insurance company from liability under 
the second coverage.1 
Uninsured motorist coverage, unlike liability and 
collision coverages, is not tied to the insured's automobile but 
covers injuries to the insured whether the injury occurs in his 
automobile or elsewhere. Thus, M[c]overage is available to the 
insured while occupying any motor vehicle, whether owned or 
nonowned, insured or uninsured, or while the insured is on foot 
or on horseback." 3 Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability 
Insurance § 31.02[8], at 31-18.2 (2d ed. 1992); see also Tucker 
v. Government Employees Ins. Co.. 288 So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla. 
1973); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan. 575 P.2d 477, 479 (Haw. 
1978); Chaffee v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 591 P.2d 
1102, 1104 (Mont. 1979); Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Ravnes. 563 
P.2d 815, 820 (Wash. 1977). 
Under the most elementary concepts of honesty and fair 
dealing, when an insured pays for two coverages and the insurance 
company collects two premiums, the insured ought to have the 
benefit of both coverages.2 The Supreme Court of Kansas has 
stated: "When we pay double premiumfs] we expect double 
coverage. This is . . . in accord with general principles of 
indemnity that amounts of premiums are based on amounts of 
liability." Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 34, 42 
(Kan. 1969). In my view, it is unconscionable to allow an 
insurance company to collect a second premium and give nothing in 
return on the ground that the insured consented to the fraud by 
virtue of a provision in the insurance contract. This is 
particularly so when the coverage is mandated by statute and the 
insured has not expressly waived it. 
1
 The other insurance claim provides: 
5. OTHER AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND 
METROPOLITAN. 
With respect to any occurrence, accident or 
loss to which this and any other automobile 
insurance policy issued to the named insured 
by METROPOLITAN also applies, the total limit 
of METROPOLITAN'S liability under all such 
policies shall not exceed the highest 
applicable limit of liability or benefit 
amount under any one such policy. 
(Bold in original.) 
2
 Clearly, a plaintiff should not be able to collect on more 
than one coverage when his damages do not exceed the first. 
However, the issue here is not one of double recovery because the 
plaintiff's injuries exceeded both coverages. 
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The inequity of allowing insurance companies to charge 
a premium on a coverage for which they will never have to pay out 
has led a large majority of courts to allow insureds to recover 
under two or more coverages, that is, to allow "stacking." See 
Great Central Ins. Co. v. Edge, 298 So. 2d 607 (Ala. 1974); Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark, v. Barnhill, 681 S.W.2d 341 (Ark. 
1984); Yacobacci v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 A.2d 987 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1976) ; Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 
2d 689 (Fla. 1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 177 
S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1970); American Ins. Co. v. Takahashi, 575 P.2d 
881 (Haw. 1978); Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 389 
N.E.2d 1150 (111. 1979); Patton v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.. 267 
N.E.2d 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 
457 P.2d 34 (Kan. 1969); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451 
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970); Bourgeois v. Government Employees Ins. 
Co. , 316 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Langston v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 561 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Cardin v. Roval 
Ins. Co. of Am., 476 N.E.2d 200 (Mass. 1985); Government 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. 1984); 
Cameron Mut. Ins. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976); Chaffee, 
591 P.2d 1102 (Mont. 1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 586 
P.2d 313 (Nev. 1978); Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 382 
S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1989); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 
594 (Okla. 1980); Sones v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 411 A.2d 
552 (Penn. 1979) ; Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 140 
S.E.2d 817 (Va. 1965); American States Ins. Co. v. Milton, 573 
P.2d 367 (Wash. 1978); see also Vernon v. Harleysville Mut. 
Casualty Co., 135 S.E.2d 841 (S.C. 1964); Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
of New York v. Gatlin, 470 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
Indeed, courts have specifically allowed insureds to 
stack coverages despite clear policy language that purports to 
prohibit stacking, whether by way of "other insurance," 
"exclusionary," "excess coverage," "anti-stacking," or other 
limiting clauses. See, e.g., Edge, 298 So. 2d at 608; Maglish. 
586 P.2d at 314-15; Brown, 446 So. 2d at 1006; Chaffee. 591 P.2d 
at 1104; Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.r 556 N.E.2d 983 
(Mass. 1990); Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.r 201 N.W.2d 
786 (Mich. 1972); Ravnes, 563 P.2d 815. 
Although the Utah statute requiring uninsured motorist 
coverage sets minimum limits for coverage, it does not fix a 
maximum limit. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-21.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983). 
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a similar statute 
requiring uninsured motorist coverage cannot be limited by 
clauses in the policy aimed at limiting liability. Blakesleer 
201 N.W.2d at 791. That court stated: 
It would be unconscionable to permit an 
insurance company offering statutorily 
required coverage to collect premiums for it 
with one hand and allow it to take the 
coverage away with the other by using a self-
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devised "other insurance" limitation. 
Nothing could more clearly defeat the 
intention of the legislature. 
Id. ; see also Boettner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 
795, 798 (Mich. 1972). In Tucker v. Government Employees 
Insurance Co.. 288 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of stacking two coverages issued under 
one policy in the context of statutorily mandated uninsured 
motorist coverage. That court stated in language that is 
applicable here: 
The total uninsured motorist coverage which 
the insured has purchased for himself and his 
family regardless of the number of vehicles 
covered by his auto liability policy inures 
to him or any member of his family when 
injured by an uninsured motorist. Moreover, 
according to Sellers v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.r [185 So. 2d 689 
(Fla. 1966),] such total coverage is 
applicable to any uninsured motorist 
negligently injuring the insured or any 
member of his family covered thereby. The 
statute admits of no authority in the insurer 
by a provision in the policy to limit 
coverage on the presumed basis that the 
uninsured motorist would only have covered 
himself with the minimum auto liability 
coverage required under F.S. Section 
324.021(7), F.S.A. The determinant of the 
amount of coverage is the total which the 
insured purchases pursuant to the authority 
of the statute and not that which the insurer 
otherwise attempts to limit by a provision in 
the policy. 
An insured under uninsured motorist 
coverage is entitled by the statute to the 
full bodily injury protection that he 
purchases and for which he pays premiums. It 
is useless and meaningless and uneconomic to 
pay for additional bodily injury insurance 
and simultaneously have this coverage 
cancelled by an insureds exclusion. The 
premium rates are standard and uniform on a 
per car basis. The insured's full protection 
cannot be whittled away by exclusions or 
limitations . . . . 
Id. at 242. In Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v. Madden. 533 
S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976), the Missouri Supreme Court, quoting Great 
Central Insurance Co. v. Edge, 298 So. 2d 607, 610 (Ala. 1974), 
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stated, "Cases should not and will not turn on how well the 
insurer drafts a limiting clause because the law does not permit 
insurers to collect a premium for certain coverage, then take 
that coverage away by such a clause no matter how clear or 
unambiguous it may be." In American Insurance Co. v. Takahashi. 
575 P.2d 881 (Haw. 1978), the Hawaii Supreme Court construed a 
limiting clause that contained language similar to the one at 
issue in this case. That court stated: 
[S]eparate uninsured motorist insurance 
coverage must be provided in at least the 
minimum statutorily required amounts for each 
automobile insured under a single liability 
insurance policy. In Morgan, three 
automobiles were insured under a single 
liability policy. We concluded that under 
the provisions of HRS §§ 431-448 and 287-7, 
$10,000 of per person uninsured motorist 
coverage was separately provided for each of 
the insured automobiles. 
We hold that the limits of liability 
clause in the policy before us is invalid 
insofar as it attempts to defeat the 
statutory requirements of HRS § 431-448. 
American cannot reduce its liability for 
uninsured motorist coverage below the 
statutorily required minimum amounts for each 
insured vehicle. See Walton v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 55 Haw. 326, 
518 P.2d 1399 (1974). Therefore the 
limitation of uninsured motorist coverage to 
a maximum of $20,000 "regardless" of the 
number of automobiles to which the policy 
applies is null and void. 
Id. at 883-884; see also Cardin v. Roval Ins. Co. of Am.
 r 476 
N.E.2d 200 (Mass. 1985); Bourgeois v. Government Employees Tna. 
CCLL, 316 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1975). 
It is indefensible to suggest, as this Court did in 
Martin v. Christensen. 454 P.2d 294 (Utah 1969), that the 
legislature intended to allow an insurance company to collect a 
premium for statutorily mandated coverage and then nullify that 
coverage with a clause in an adhesion contract. I would overrule 
Martin v. Christensen to the extent that it prohibits stacking 
when more than one premium has been paid. 
Clauses in insurance policies that prevent stacking are 
inconsistent with the general statutory policy mandating 
uninsured motorist coverage. They are also unconscionable and 
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should be stricken to the extent that they allow an insurance 
company to refuse coverage after collecting premiums for what 
appears to be statutorily mandated coverages. See generally 
Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1040-42 
(Utah 1985) ; Donald M. Zupance, Annotation, Doctrine of 
Unconscionabilitv As Applied to Insurance Contracts, 86 A.L.R.3d 
862 (1978). 
I dissent. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Stewart, 
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, does not participate 
herein; Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
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ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
) MENDED COMPLAINT 
MARK C'REILL". LINDA ~; 
and KE: "*OFOLI7AN PROPEI 
LIABILITY INSURANCE CO 
Defendants. 
.iO . l d / - ^ o o 
Hcr.er F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff; through his counsel complains of defendants and 
alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Richard H. Nielsen, is a resident cf Salt 
Lake County, State of T;tah. 
2. Defendant, Mark O'Reilly, was at the time of the 
accident a v;oident of Salt lake Count*/, State of Utah. 
-^ .naa 
T. T> a resident of Salt Lake 
4. Defendant Xetrcpciitan Property S Liability Insurance 
Company is a foreign corporation transacting insurance business 
in the State of Utah. 
5. At all tir.es mentioned herein, defendant insurance 
company!s actions and omissions were performed by said 
defendant's agents and employees ;;ho were at all times acting 
within the purpose and scope of their agency and employment, and 
defendant insurance company approved the acts of its agents and 
employees relating hereto. 
r:.Kbi Lr.ubo Or /-»CJ. 1UW 
6. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 5 above. 
7. Defendant Mark O'Reilly, on or about April 28, 19S3, 
was driving a vehicle owned by defendant ~inda R. French in a 
necrlicrent and ^  or reckless manner ard coll"' "ed w* th olaintiff fs 
vehicle while plaintiff v?s driving eastbov~d on 4500 South 
Street, at the intersection cf TOO East and 4500 South, Murray, 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
S. At the time cf the accident, defendant O'Reilly was 
legally intoxicated and negligently and carelessly operated his 
vehicle in such a manner that manifested a reckless disregard or 
indifference to the rights and safety of others. 
9. As a proximate result of defendant O'Reilly's conduct, 
plaintiff incurred cov-?--;- .<r:d r: eminent personal injuries, the 
for a period of time and has incurred substantial lost earnings 
and will continue to lose earnings in the future. Plaintiff has 
and will continue to suffer great pain, discomfort, emotional 
trauma, permanent partial disability and disfigurement. 
10. As a further proximate result of defendant O'Reilly's 
conduct, plaintiff sustained property damage to his 1970 Buick 
Skylark. 
11. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover all 
special and general damages in an amount of at least $300,000, to 
be determined at the time of trial. 
SECO::P CAUSE OF ACTION 
12- Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 11 above. 
13. Defendant Linda R. French, *>;ith knovrledge of 
defendant O'Reilly's intoxicated state.. negligently and 
carelessly consented tc defendant O'Reilly's operation of her 
vehicle, thereby exhibiting an reckless disregard or indifference 
to the rights and safety of others. 
14. As a proximate result of defendant French's conduct, 
she is liable for all of the plaintiff's damages resulting from 
the accident described above. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
15. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 thrcugh 14 above. 
t-: C'Ro'll"?c end French's conduct exhibited 
plaintiff to recover punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 11 through 16 above. 
18. Defendant insurance company has provided uninsured 
motorist insurance to plaintiff Richard Nielsen, wherein 
defendant insurance company agreed to indemnify plaintiff for 
damages sustained in any accident caused by the negligence of the 
operator of any uninsured vehicle up to the policy limit of 
$250,000.00. 
19. The collision described above was caused entirely by 
the negligence of defendants O'Reilly and French, who were 
uninsured at the time of the accident. 
20. After the accident plaintiff node timely demand on 
defendant insurance company fcr payment of plaintiff's damages as 
provided by the terms of the insurance policy. Defendant 
insurance company has refusad and still refuses payment of all 
damages sustained as a result from the accident. 
21. Defendant insurance company is therefore liable to 
plaintiff for all damages plaintiff is entitled to recover 
against defendants O'Reilly and French. 
V7HEREF0RE, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
defendants O'Reilly and French, jointly and severally, for 
cornonsatarv da~""ar; ':.r: -an amount to bo '.ictr-rr.-'ned at trial and 
at trial, together with pre-judgment interest, costs and all 
other relief deemed equitable by the court. Plaintiff further 
prays for judgment against defendant insurance company for 
indemnification for ail damages incurred by plaintiff in the 
above-described accident, together with pre-judgment interest, 
costs and ail other relief deemed equitable by the court. 
DLTED this 16th day of August, 1938. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By fi*M^*t ^a^fi<^JK 
L. Rich Kumpherys 
Richard van't Rood 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
